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Abstract  
 
This project is a study of the attempt to reform the IMF with the purpose of legitimizing the fund. It 
analyses the processes of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform and how it has been affected by 
the distribution of power within the IMF’s governance structure. The project argues that power 
relations within the IMF have shaped the content of the reform as well as allowed the current 
gridlock in which the reform process is stuck. 
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1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem area and delimitation  
 
Throughout time the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been subject to much criticism. More 
recently this criticisms has revolved around accusations of a lack of a legitimate system of 
representation in the IMF’s governance structure. Critics argue that the IMF has not been able to 
adapt to a changing world order in which an increasing amount of economic activity occurs outside 
the old economic core. 
In 2010 a reform aimed at better representing new important economies in the IMF was presented. 
The reform, officially named the 2010 Quota Governance Reform, aimed at  strengthening the 
position of dynamic economies in the IMF in order to better reflect the world economies matter 
thereby increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the fund.  
While aware that similar changes have both been proposed and implemented in the IMF 
beforehand, most recently in the shape of a smaller reform implemented in 2008, this project 
focuses mainly on the process of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform. This is mainly because 
this is the most ambitious reform of the IMF’s governance structure to date.  
1.2 Research Question 
 
In this project we seek to assess the process of this reform in the light of the current distribution of 
power within the IMF’s governance system. To help us do so we have formulated the following 
research question:  
To what extent is the current distribution of power within the IMF’s governance structure affecting 
the process of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform? 
We will answer the Research Question by first assessing the Governance structure of the IMF. Then 
we will turn our attention towards the 2010 reform and analyze why it was necessary and how 
power have shaped the content of this reform. In the last chapter, we will first look at why the 
reform process has hit a gridlock, and then we will discuss possible ways for the IMF to move 
forward as well as some of the consequences of this gridlock. 
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2 Theory, concepts and methods 
 
This chapter presents the theory, key concepts and methods used to analyze the current governance 
structure of the IMF, the proposed 2010 Reform, and the process to implement the Reform. This 
chapter will introduce constructivism in International Relations, a constructivist approach to the 
analysis of power, approaches to studying International Organizations, and some key concepts for 
further analysis. Throughout this chapter an explanation of why the project has have chosen the 
particular theoretical framework will be presented as well as the methods applied. The reason for 
this simultaneous presentation of both theory and methods is that the theory underlines and shapes 
the methods used. In order specify the methods used, this chapter will end by briefly summarizing 
these, and the project’s reflections on applying those.  
 
2.1 Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is a relatively new theoretic approach to studying social science and international 
relations. Constructivism in international relations has gained a substantial following as a reaction 
to the fall of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, in the means of explaining what 
neorealist and liberal theories could not (Barnett 2008). A fundamental difference between 
constructivism and realism, or liberalism for that matter, is that the constructivist approach 
distances itself from the positivist worldview. Realists and Liberalists both argue, to a certain 
degree, that universal truths and facts about International Relations can be discovered. This 
positivist ontology is very different from the foundation of the constructivist approach in that it is 
largely based on an assumption that states are rational actors. The primary focus of these schools of 
international relations have been to discern (and predict) the patterns of behavior while questions 
about identity- and interest formation have had little, if any, relevance (Wendt 1992, Barnett, 2008). 
These so-called rationalist schools can for this reason be accused of reducing processes in 
international relations to mere behavioral interactions; they focus on what states do and not what 
they are (Wendt 1992). Constructivism on the other hand, is a “reflectivist” school (Wendt 1992). It 
does not try to predict behavioral patterns, but is instead concerned with the role that human 
consciousness plays in international relations (Barnett 2008).  
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Most theories of international relations agree that the international system is in a state of Anarchy. 
In this respect, constructivists agree with Liberals and Realists. However, Constructivism will claim 
that anarchy not just is. Instead Anarchy in the international system is something that exists through 
social processes rather than an ontologically exogenous, independent structure that simply exists. It 
is a kind of collective knowledge that is experienced as existing objectively; it is a social fact 
(Barnett 2008). Consequently, there is no inherent “logic” of anarchy as the ordering principle, but 
instead “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992, p. 395). 
This idea of there being no “logic” of anarchy is one of the reasons why this project has chosen a 
constructivist approach in order to answer the research question. By using this approach the project 
enables itself to understand and identify state actions as more than “self-help” or profit maximizing 
behavior. Instead of working under the constraint of rational choice theories, the application of 
constructivism allows the project to examine the behavior of states as a product of human 
interactions.   
 
2.1.1  The dimensions of Power  
 
A common misconception of constructivism is that it does not give much attention to power politics 
and self-help behavior. This does not have to be the case. Rather, a constructivist view of power is 
more broad, or complex, than the one taken by a Realist or a Liberal. Realists and Liberals will 
typically use the concept of power as explained by Robert Dahl as being: “When A forces B to do 
what he otherwise wouldn’t do” (Barnett & Duvall 2005). Barnett & Duvall (2005) have created 
such constructivist “taxonomy” of power, based on the two dimensions through which power 
works: (1) The kind of social relation through which power works as well as (2) the specificity of 
that relation. The kind of social relation can either be between two already constituted actors, or it 
can be between two actors constituting each other. The social relation also has a degree of 
specificity: it is either specific, direct and immediate (like A and B talking) or abstract and socially 
diffuse (A making B do something through rules) 
Based on these dimensions that the power works within, Barnett and Duvall claim that power 
operates in four ways: It can be compulsory, structural, institutional or productive. 
Compulsory power, is defined as “power as relations of interaction of direct control by one actor 
over another” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p.43). It can for example be when the strong forces the 
weak to do its will through direct means (sanctions, military force etc.). Compulsory power is not 
2010 Quota and Governance Reform 
International Studies  
 
8 
8 
limited to use of material force however, and it is not always the case that an actor changes the 
behavior of another deliberately. But it is always the case, that when an actor exerts control over 
another by direct means, we are speaking of compulsory power (Barnett and Duvall 2005). 
Institutional Power is the “the control actors exercise indirectly over others through diffuse 
relations of interaction” (p. 43). It is an indirect (or diffuse) way of shaping other actors’ behavior 
by making the rules and conditions that they take action under. It is often the case that one actor 
uses its dominance in an organization or institution as the indirect method of exercising control over 
another actor; “Long-standing institutions represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias that 
can continue to shape the future choices of actors” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 52). Power 
asymmetries are “frozen”, because powerful actors have used their power in the organization to 
raise the threshold for change, as is the case in the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions.  
Structural Power is the “constitution of subjects’ capacities in direct structural relation to one 
another” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, P.43). Structural power is thus the type of power actors 
perform to shape the conditions for the ‘arena’ in which actors interact. By influencing these 
conditions the actor will be able to shape the affected actors identities and make them accept the 
conditions for their interactions.  
Productive power is “the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and 
signification” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p.43). Productive power is found in the way actors 
communicate and interact and is typically the power of using discourse to shape another actor’s 
understanding.  
How these four types of power are distributed in the IMF, and how they have shaped the 2010 
Quota and Governance Reform process, will be be analyzed in the project.  
 
2.2 International Organizations  
 
Besides the rejection of positivist epistemology in International Relations, and the wish to 
operationalize power broadly, the project have also chosen a constructivist approach because it 
allows an examination of organizations and institutions as independent actors aside from their 
members. Some of the debate between constructivists on one hand, and state-centric liberal and 
realist theories on the other, is revolving around whether international organizations (IOs) are 
passive structures used by states for utility-maximizing purposes, or whether they are autonomous 
agents with a life of their own (Barnett and Finnermore 1999). A constructivist conception of 
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international organizations (IOs) is that IOs have been given separate legal-rational authority, by the 
member states, which makes them ontologically distinct from their creators, consequently making 
them independent and autonomous actors. They are, in other words, independent structures. Thus, 
while IOs may reflect state preferences, the, in constructivist conceptions, have a degree of 
autonomy that makes them more than merely levers of certain states. This can mean that 
organizations have their own distinct traditions, norms and cultural traits, which may or may not 
belong to that organization’s concerns of legitimacy and regard for its role in global governance 
(Barnett and Finnermore 1999). Not only is an international organization often an entity in a 
sociological sense, it is also perceived very real to those who work in it and are “doing their job” 
there (ibid). 
 
This view stands in contrast to the way that IOs typically have been perceived by liberalists and 
realists of various traditions. These theoretical strands have tended to view IOs as mechanisms, or 
arenas for actors, usually states, and thus not as actors in themselves. In the same way that the 
market in neoclassical economics is filled with profit-maximizing firms, the international anarchic 
realm in international relations is filled with security and/or power maximizing states (Balding and 
Wehrenfennig 2011). In this way the effect of international organizations is to provide information 
that lead to utility maximizing outcomes for states (ibid).  
 
In order to understand all of the activities of the IMF, it is necessary first to analyze the organization 
and its bureaucratic machinery. The project do not consider it possible to conduct an analysis of the 
organizational structure without acknowledging that the organization has a body of its own, even 
though the IMF in many ways may be dependent of its member-states. Furthermore, the project 
builds on the assumption that there are a number of additional advantages connected to viewing IOs 
as ontologically separate from the states that create them. By doing so the project avoid falling into 
a trap of theoretical inconsistency by giving some actors agency and autonomy while ignoring that 
of others.  One cannot simply focus on the functioning, and interests of state actors, and assume that 
one should not do so for IOs as well (Barnett and Finnermore 1999). Furthermore, by not having to 
view organizations through a state-centric lens, the project enables a better understanding of the 
IMFs activities and actions and which allows a study of the reform process from within the 
organization as well as outside.  
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2.2.1 Organizational Theory  
 
In order to approach IOs as important independent entities of analysis, this project applies 
Organizational Theory to the study of IOs. Such approach is taken by Ellis (2010) in what he dubs 
a “corporate paradigm” of IOs. This corporate ontology of IOs will “incorporate bureaucracy as 
both a structural and agentive component in the analysis with effects across levels of analysis” 
(Ellis 2010 p.18). In this model the thinking behind the levels of analysis in international relations is 
transferred onto IOs and general organization theory. The three levels are: (1) Image/Intra-
organizational Analysis’, (2) Image/Organizational Analysis’ and (3) Image/Inter-organizational 
Analysis’. 
 
The Intra-organizational Analysis consists of examining the internal procedures and processes of 
the organization; a listing of who works where, and an understanding of the general bureaucracy of 
the organization. It is also the understanding of the ‘’tasks that make up organizations” (Ellis 2010, 
p 23). In the case of the IMF, this will include an explanation of the tasks of the head of the 
organization, the work of the Executive Board and the other ministries that operate on regular basis 
in the organization. 
The Organizational Analysis is focused on the internal structures of an organization, meaning it’s 
possible autonomy to make decisions and its goals for existing. Every organization has a task of 
conducting something, whether it is promoting world peace or financial stability. This means that 
the boundaries that the organization have for achieving these goals, must be studied.  
The Inter-organizational Analysis revolves around the position in the international society the 
organizations have: What is the view of the organization, and how it operates and cooperates in the 
international system? The effectiveness of the organization is underlined as an important factor to 
investigate (ibid).  
This method of analysis will enable the IMF as an organization to be examined thoroughly on the 
different levels and aspects of analysis and thus combines organization and international relations 
theory. In this project’s analysis we will focus on these internal structures’ abilities and boundaries 
in the process of reforming the IMF.  
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2.3 Operationalization of concepts 
 
This next part will introduce some key concept used to explain the current structure of the IMF, the 
international world in which it operates, and the ideas and normative factors that underlines these.  
2.3.1 Legal-rational organization  
 
A legal-Rational organization is a structure, in which norms and practices are bound by a set of rule 
that those inside the organization must adhere to. Most modern nation-states are examples, as they 
are run by bureaucracies and have an institutionalized law (Balding and Wehrenfennig 2011). In 
this type of organization, the structure of it allows it to conduct its purpose without the content of its 
members, leaving the members merely to provide resources, and conduct the strategy in which the 
purpose of the organization is implemented (ibid). In the case of the IMF, this shows in the 
institution ability to provide loans with the aim of economic growth to countries, on the criteria that 
the country changes certain policies, in accordance to IMF’s normative understanding of how to 
achieve economic growth.  
 
2.3.2  Coactivational organization 
 
A coactivational organization is where the organization or institution depends on the input of each 
member. As is implied in the formulation, the behaviors of actors in this kind of institution are 
activating each other by taking actions that provokes responses. A coactivational organization is 
therefore actor-driven rather than rule-driven (Balding and Wehrenfennig, 2011).  Such an 
organization often has little infrastructure for altering the behavior of any particular state, should 
states not form large coalitions. IMF is also included in this definition of an organization since its 
internal structures; with an uneven division of votes, veto power and a general unwillingness 
towards change, infuses the members, and proves it difficult for IMF to implement any internal 
structural reforms. 
 
2.3.3 Legitimacy  
 
The concept of legitimacy is introduced in order to analyze and discuss what understanding of the 
IMF, the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform represents. The idea of reforming the structure, or 
perhaps even the main task of the IMF, is not merely a result of the financial crisis, but rather a part 
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of an ongoing discussion of and by the Fund (Helleiner, 2007). Understanding the discussion of 
how the IMF should reform itself, and how this discussion has changed with the crisis, helps 
explain the context and content of the 2010 Reform. 
 
2.4 Methods  
 
This part of the chapter will briefly summarize the methods presented so far as well as present a 
more in depth walk through the process behind this project in order to showcase the methods used.  
 
First, this project does not generate any original qualitative or quantitative data, meaning that there 
has not been collected any new data on the subject of the IMF’s internal structure or the world in 
which it exist. This is due to two main factors. First of all it is very difficult to obtain the possibility 
of interviewing head members of the Fund, which are the ones that would be of most help in 
answering the research question. Doing so would also require a substantial amount of time and 
money to go to Washington and actually meet people there. For this reason the project has relied on 
other researchers studies. There are some both critical, well-documented, and thorough studies 
made on issues concerning the Fund, the implementation of the 2010 Reform and on how the 
powerful actors influencing these. That does not mean, however, that this project merely repeat 
previous studies. By including multiple sources from various authors, representing very varied 
views on the Fund, the project seek to present a nuanced analysis of what ideas and understandings 
of power have constituted the 2010 Reform. With that said, the project has faced some constraints 
regarding sources. For instance an exact overview of how negotiations have proceeded and of who 
said what and when has not been possible to find. Therefore the project has been reliant on those 
studies made by researchers who have actually been interviewing people who are present in the 
IMF and the G20. This puts one in risk of adopting certain bias’ other researchers may have, 
although the project has tried to avoid this mistake by diversifying our sources as much as possible, 
as well as by sticking to literature released in peer-reviewed journals. 
Another issue is that many of the studies of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform available are 
paying primary attention to the more technical and descriptive aspects of our problem area.  The 
project has aimed to go deeper into some analytical questions, which has been a little more difficult 
than merely describing the reform.  
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2.4.1 Qualitative content analysis 
 
The project has applied a qualitative content analysis.  
As mentioned, this project includes both scientific and more analytical newspaper articles 
containing results of studies of the IMF and the Reform. We will also analyze and official 
documents deriving from private sources - i.e. the IMF itself. In doing so it is vital to pay attention 
to the origins of the sources - which the authors are, and for what purpose the study or article was 
created. While this is not something this project explicitly comments on, it is something that has 
been given a great deal of attention to in the research and writing phases.   
In particular the project as a whole has paid attention to how official documents, such the 
compendium by the IMF that explains the structure and bodies of the Fund, might only represent 
the aspects of the organization that the IMF wants to present. While this project does not speculate 
on whether this official data from the IMF is a true representation of what actually goes on, it has 
been comparing it to more independent sources. Other sources, such as the ones coming from 
NGOs (i.e. Bretton Woods Project and New Ideas), might to a similar extent depict issues in a way 
that one cannot be sure of. Therefore the project has been careful not only to critically assess the 
sources, but also use them in the proper context.  
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3 Historical Introduction to the IMF  
 
The International Monetary Fund was founded as a response to the aftermath of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s as countries resorted to protectionist measures and global trade severely 
declined (IMF 2015, 1). At the end of the Second World War, 45 nations from all over the world 
met up at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in order to re-establish world trade and global financial 
stability. As a result, two organizations - The World Bank and the IMF - were created (Ibid). The 
World Bank was designed to help development projects and assist in projects reconstructing the 
post-war structure, while the IMF was established to survey financial flows in the world economy 
(Barkin, 2006). The IMF came into functioning just a year later, in 1945, with its organizational 
purpose and obligation for the member countries formulated into a treaty; the Articles of Agreement 
(Ibid). At the time 29 nations had assigned their support to the Agreements, which included the 
tasks of promoting “international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution”, and 
securing “the expansion and balanced growth of international trade”, and among other things 
eliminate “foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade” (Articles of 
Agreement).  
As the leading country in the establishment of the IMF, the United States and its currency came to 
play a significant role in the setup of the organization's functioning. The currency used in the fund, 
were to be the US dollar, which was set as a fixed price of 1 ounce (33.10 g) of gold = 35 dollars. 
This indirectly resulted in the newly founded IMF to have maintain a fixed exchange rate as its 
main task (Weiss, 2014). The IMF was therefore from its very beginning an institution with a 
significant dependency of the US dollar. 
With the establishment of the IMF (and the World Bank) states had come together under the 
leadership of the US to create an international organization, with monetary efficiency-making 
through transparent financial flows, as its overall goal (Barkin, 2006). While the IMF, like many 
other international organizations and institutions, consists of states as members, it still had its 
organizational purpose independent of those states. It is employing economists and other staff to 
conduct the research needed for evaluating lending conditions and states economic behavior. 
Therefore the IMF was not established as a democratic organization, but rather with a hierarchical 
structure alike profit-seeking corporations, which allowed the fund to finance its own expenditures 
through interest rates off the loans given to states (Ibid).  
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However, in the 1970s, The US experienced financial instability, while several other currencies had 
exceeded the value of the Dollar that was tied to the value of gold. The IMF had not been able to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate among the world’s growing economies, and dissociation from the 
devaluing dollar was necessary (Weiss, 2014). By 1973, the IMF’s main purpose; keeping the fixed 
exchange rate stabile, had failed and the fund experienced a change of purpose. The Articles of 
Agreements were reconciled, and as more rapidly expanding economies experienced large deficits, 
the IMF changed its focus to a more lending and surveillance based foundation (Ibid). The shift 
from maintaining a fixed exchange rate to a flowing market based, resulted in the fund creating its 
‘own’ currency; the Special Drawing Rights (SDR’s), fixed at a price of 0.88 g gold. Nowadays 
however, the SDR is based on the average of a basket of currencies including the US dollar, Yen, 
Euro and Pound Sterling instead (Ibid).  
With the new increased focus of monitoring trade and financial flows, along with the engagement 
as the lender of last resort in several financial crises, the IMF became an increasingly important 
global governing institution. The conditions for national trade policies that countries in crisis 
needed to undertake (the infamous Structural Adjustment Policies) in order to receive financial 
assistance from the IMF, became subject to increased criticism. The IMF, critics claimed, applied 
one-size fits all neoliberal policies conducted regardless of a country’s situation or ideology (Chang 
2008, Stiglitz 2002). This criticism escalated in the early 1990’s with IMF loan conditions being, 
according to some critics, the direct cause of the Asian Financial Crisis (Helleiner, and Momani, 
2007). In the aftermath of this crisis, the IMF had become very unpopular among the Asian 
countries, and other emerging market economies soon endorsed the critics, stating that the 
legitimacy of the fund was severely lacking (ibid) 
To reinforce the legitimacy of the IMF soon became the Fund’s new code of conduct to enforcing 
good governance, whereas before it had been focusing on maintaining and promoting transparent 
global financial flows (Barkin, 2006). While many aimed their critiques at the lending conditions, 
more and more member countries turned their criticism towards the quota system which they 
believed to lack legitimate representation of the world’s economies (Helleiner and Momani, 2007). 
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4 IMF’s governance structure and influencing actors 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will lay out the IMF’s governance structure. First, we will explain the formal 
structure; the various boards and advisory boards as well as the quota system that forms the IMF’s 
system of representation. Throughout the chapter we will assess how power is distributed within 
and across the IMF’s governance structure.  
4.2 IMF’s governance structure 
 
The international treaty on which the International Monetary Fund is based is called the Articles of 
Agreement. The Articles of Agreement provides the rules for the functioning of the organization as 
well as the obligations and rights for those members who have joined the IMF. These articles have 
been amended and altered multiple times, and it is clear that they were never meant to be too static 
for the IMF to conform to a changing world (Mountford 2008).  
 
4.2.1 The Board of Governors 
 
When understanding the bodies that make up the IMF’s governance structure, it is necessary first to 
look towards the Board of Governors (BoG). This board officially represents the highest decision-
making unit within the IMF and it therefore has a number of assigned explicit powers. Policies 
falling within these areas have to be decided by the Board of Governors and cannot be conferred to 
other bodies of the IMF (Ibid). The Board of Governors also has various implicit powers meaning 
that any policy matter that does not fall directly within the jurisdiction of any specific organ is the 
task of the Board of Governors (Articles of Agreement XII Section 2a). The Board of Governors 
consists of representatives from the 188 different nations that are members of the IMF. As is also 
the case in practically all the IMF’s other bodies, these representatives are assigned a certain 
amount of voting power according to their quota share (Mountford 2008).   
Despite being the highest-ranking body, The Board of Governors only has one annual meeting 
where representatives from the World Bank also are present. During these annual meetings 
members discuss challenges in the global economy, and decide on the appropriate courses of action. 
It is also at these meetings the Executive Directors are approved by the representatives in the Board 
of Governors (Ibid).  
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Because of its large size and infrequent meetings, the board of governors is not a very practical 
forum for high-level decisions, debates, or difficult negotiations. Consequently, the Board of 
Governors’ annual meetings have become largely “ceremonial”, and most of its powers have, in 
accordance with articles of agreement XII section 2b and 2f, been delegated to the Executive Board 
(Ibid). This does not include the explicit rules, which cannot be conferred. Should an issue that falls 
within these explicit rules appear, and should that issue require ad-hoc voting by the Board of 
Governors, the representatives will vote via e-mail (ibid).  
 
4.2.2 The executive board 
 
Below the Board of Governors is the Executive Board (EB). The EB is led by the Managing 
Director and is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the IMF. Unlike the Board of Governors, 
the EB regularly meets to discuss and take action; “as often as the work of the Fund may require” 
(Article XII, Section 3g). Although the EB as a decision-making unit is still technically under the 
Board of Governors, the EB is in practice the most important body of the IMF, holding some very 
crucial powers in the IMF. Some of these are stated directly by the Articles of agreement, while 
others have been delegated by the Board of Governors to the Executive Board (Mountford, 2008). 
The EB discusses and takes decisions on a large array of issues ranging from lending decisions to 
the so-called economic “health checks”(IMF Factsheet 1). The EB, under the Chairmanship of the 
Managing Director, is thus the most active policy-making organ of the IMF.  Accordingly, a 
statement that ‘the Fund has decided’ almost always means, ‘the Executive Board has decided’ 
(Mountford, 2008, p. 26). 
The Executive Board consists of 24 executive directors, five of whom represent the countries that 
have the largest quota shares (Articles of Agreement XII, Section 3b(i)). 16 of the directors are 
representing constituencies of multiple countries. One of these Executive Directors, Ngueto Tiraina 
Yambaye, represents a constituency of 23 African countries (IMF 2015 3). The last three Executive 
Directors are representing emerging markets that are large enough to have their own seat at the EB: 
Russia, Saudi-Arabia and China. Each board member has a number of votes attached to it. The 
Great 5 European Nations, the US and Japan in particular, wield enormous voting power in this 
board, and the European nations hold 7 constituencies, making European countries appear 
“overrepresented”, particularly in per capita terms (IMF 2015 3).  
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4.2.3 Managing director and staff 
 
The members of the executive board choose the Managing Director (MD) of the IMF, currently 
Christine Lagarde. Besides being the chairman of the Executive board and being present at all 
Board of Governors, and International Monetary and Financial Council (IMFC), meetings the 
Managing Director is the chief of the operating staff of the fund and chief of conducting the 
ordinary business of the fund on a daily basis (Mountford, 2008). The MD is also the outward face 
of the IMF, and the one that appoints three of the deputy managing directors. The managing 
director, despite not having any votes, can therefore be a powerful persuasive actor, both through 
that person’s technical and practical overview of all the workings in the IMF, and through the MD’s 
ethos as the leader of the IMF (ibid).  The managing director can to a large degree decide the course 
of action for the legal-rational part of the IMF and holds large productive power in (currently) her 
ability to set certain agendas (ibid). For instance, Christine Lagarde is famous for setting 
empowerment of women high on the IMF’s agenda and for claiming that including women in the 
economic life of societies can be a driver of growth (Alter, 2015).  
 
4.2.4 Other Bodies of the IMF 
 
The Board of Governors and the Executive Board are advised by a number of committees with each 
an area of focus. Some of these committees are part of the IMF’s internal bureaucracy. They are 
mostly advisory bodies, albeit influential ones. Others, particularly the Groups of Seven, ten and 
Twenty, are informal gatherings of some of the most powerful actors in the IMF (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2015).  
The most important advisory body to the Executive Board is the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee (IMFC), which are assigned with the task to release communiqués with 
proposals on how to address issues in the global economy on a six-month basis. In practice the 
IMFC has become one of the main sources of recommendations, guidance and feedback to the EB. 
The IMFC often takes the initiative for discussing new policy making. Many of these initiatives are 
taken by releasing communiqués in language such as the IMFC is “looking forward to” or “agrees 
that the IMF needs to” (Shakow 2008, p.72). The process of a creating a communiqué consists of 
(1) setting an agenda, (2) gain technical background knowledge, (3) meeting, (4) communiqué 
drafting and (5) plenary session (ibid).  As a secretary in the IMF states: “the IMFC communiqué 
has turned out to be a key vehicle for providing fairly specific guidance on the Fund’s policy 
2010 Quota and Governance Reform 
International Studies  
 
19 
19 
directions going forwards and, in that context, provides the key framework for the biannual 
statement by the Managing Director on the work program of the executive directors” (ibid p. 66). 
The IMFC has thus been very influential as it has formulated the strategic directions of various 
decisions taken in the fund. In practice, many see the IMFC as a kind of decision-making body – 
thereby one that exceeds its formal mandate (ibid).  The composition of the IMFC reflects that of 
the Executive board. It is comprised of selected members of the Board of Governors, that is central 
bank directors, finance ministers or the like of 24 of IMF’s member countries. The committee 
members take decisions based on consensus rather than votes as such. The International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (IMFC) is the gateway between the IMF’s internal structural bodies and 
the G20 (ibid). It is comparable to the G20 regarding its power in the IMF, but rather as a formal 
actor operating within the IMF’s internal system as opposed to the G20’s indirect influence. It 
functions as a supporting body attending most meeting held by the G20 countries, and its tasks 
among other consists of publishing communiqués, bringing information of the issues at hand 
needing assessment from the fund (ibid). The reform processes, which we will describe in this 
project, have therefore formally “entered” the IMF via. The IMFC.  
 
4.3 The G20  
 
The G20, Group of Twenty, consists of the world’s 20 largest economies including the most 
important emerging markets such as the BRICS and the MINTs and the members make up a whole 
of 85% of world GDP and 75% of world trade (G20, 2015). The G20 was created by a group of 
seven countries (G7), in order to better coordinate economic policies and strengthen economic and 
financial cooperation as a response to the Asian Financial Crisis, where the IMF experienced severe 
critiques of its actions (Rapkin & Strand, 2006). It is also said to be the most direct response to 
increased multi-polarity in the global economy (Wade 2011). While the IMF has its organizational 
purpose of monitoring global financial flows and assisting in balance of payments issues, the G20 
was created in order to strengthen cooperation in these areas, which implicit acknowledges its 
structural power in the fund (Rapkin & Strand, 2006, Barkin, 2006). Although the G20 discuss a 
wide range of issues, including security policy issues, its meetings are often coordinated in relation 
to the IMF and often precede the IMF’s meetings (IMF factsheet 1).  
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4.4 The Quota system 
 
The quota system has been a part of the Articles of Agreement ever since the creation of the fund 
and constitutes the internal framework of member-states’ interaction. The system represents rules 
that appoint how much and what kind of influence a country can hold in the organization. The value 
of shares held by a country reflect how many votes it can cast in internal decision makings, how 
much the country needs to pay the fund and how much it can access in times of crisis. An 
assessment including calculation and evaluation of each country is therefore conducted, when that 
nation applies for membership. The decision of how many quota shares should be distributed to a 
country is loosely based on an economic formula that includes both abstract, qualitative conditions 
such as the ‘openness’ of a country (referring to the extent protective national barriers towards e.g. 
FDI is present) alongside more quantitative measures such as GDP and national reserves (Bénassy-
Quéré & Béreau, 2011). This formula’s result is termed the ‘calculated shares’ and is used as a 
foundation for the official decision of how shares are divided. Despite these technical measures, the 
actual number of shares a country receives upon entering the fund is often reached through a 
consensus within the EB, rather than following the exact result of the formula (Rapkin & Strand, 
2006). This convention shows that the distribution of quota shares is in fact quite political in nature 
as a country’s quota decides the “financial and organizational relationship with the IMF” (i.e. 
voting power) (IMF, 2015, 2). It is the result of a process of determining how much money a 
country can place in the Fund, and of investigating its needs for financial support in the future. The 
quota thus determines the amount of financial resources needed for the Fund when achieving 
membership, the votes the country should receive aside from its basic votes (based on its financial 
status) as well as the amount of financial resources the country can access (ibid). 
Since the meeting at Bretton Woods, adjustments to the calculating method have been made several 
times as a response to critical debates. Until the 1980s there were several different quota formulae 
bringing along very complex calculations. Later, these formulas were simplified and in the late 
1990’s it was decided that the IMF should only use a variation of 5 different formulae with the aim 
of including the aforementioned fund favored aspects of a country’s economy e.g. export/import, & 
openness (Anon 2002). 
The logic of the quota system can be found in the organizational purpose of the Fund. As mentioned 
in the historical introduction, the IMF was made to be a somewhat independent actor, aiming at 
profitable outcomes while still assessing its role as a global financial governance institution. The 
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way the quota formulae are calculated are therefore a measurement of the funds private cost-benefit 
analysis. As one scholar states; “it is natural to grant large voting rights to large shareholders. In the 
event of a crisis, big shareholders will likely need more financing than small ones” (Bénassy-Quéré 
& Béreau, 2011, p 2). However, this method of evaluating a country’s possible need for assistance 
has resulted in an unequal share of quota division. Partly because not all countries scores the same 
result in the quota calculation, but mainly because the IMF, unlike the UN for instance, does not 
require its members to pay the fund regularly. The IMF was in large part meant to be a self-
supporting organization through its interest rates (Barkin 2006). This means that the state payments 
to the Fund, is more an occasional happening. However long-term member countries have been able 
to increase their payments to the Fund in order to access larger amounts of financial resources in the 
case of crisis. For every 100.000 SDR’s deposited one additional vote is given to the country (IMF, 
2015, 2).  
While the actual logic behind it is arguable, the actual result of this method has resulted in a sort of 
‘pay-to-win’ hierarchy within the IMF (Barkin, 2006). This has concrete implications in the shape 
of veto power among long-term member countries. The United States alone holds 16% voting 
shares relevant for any decision required amendments to the Articles of Agreements which by the 
treaty requires a majority of 85% and together with Japan and the European countries their shares 
represents majority (Barkin, 2006).  
This over-representation of especially the European countries that only constitutes less than one 
third of the world GDP, has led the increasing demands for enhanced legitimacy in the 
representation of emerging markets such as the BRICS and other EMDCs (Wade 2011). 
Particularly the smaller developing countries such as Tuvalu has most of its influence stemming 
from the 250 basic votes every country receive upon entering the Fund. With a paid resource pool 
of just 1.8 million SDR’s (IMF 2015, 2) , the country barely has a voice. 
When taking a closer look at the 250 basic votes given to each member, one will find that the 
additional votes has experienced great increases through the past 7 decades. In comparison the basic 
votes received close to none (Rapkin & Strand, 2006). In total these only form a mere 5% of all 
votes, and new members of the fund neither have a long history of increased ‘pay-to-win’ votes, nor 
the economy to achieve these, since they are often the ones in need for financial assistance. 
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4.5 Distribution of power within the Governance Structure 
 
As is indirectly implicated in our research question, the governance structure of the IMF is not 
politically neutral, and it was never meant to be. A closer look at this structure, however, will reveal 
that power is distributed quite unequally. This is visible in a number of areas:  
Most importantly, several western powers holds veto-power. The large European states do if they 
combine their votes, while the US is the only country to unilaterally hold a veto.  This US influence 
on matters in the IMF is particularly expressed at the quota reviews (that in theory should happen 
every 5 years). At each quota review meeting, due to US veto power, the lack of insurance of 
approval from the US congress puts a constrain the IMF’s decisions (Woods, 2003).  
 
The US is also the most manned representative at the IMF (Woods, 2003). This gives it a capacity 
to consult the IMF-staff on practically all matters. This is particularly important when the US 
wishes to push a certain policy through, as the support of the other members on the executive is 
needed. The process of consulting the IMF-staff is a huge operation behind the scenes, in which all 
constituencies have to be consulted either bi- or multilaterally. This advantage also allows the US to 
gather support in a way that does not cause “counterproductive reactions” (ibid, p. 19). 
 
Most critique of the IMF’s (as well as the World Bank) current governance structure comes from 
the increasing demand for better representation of countries outside the “old” economic core 
(Wade, 2011, Vestergaard and Wade, 2014). It is increasingly obvious that the IMF’s internal 
governance structure has to better reflect the changes in the gravity of the world economy, both in 
order to stay relevant as well as a legitimate institution in Global Governance. The 2010 Quota and 
Governance Reform aimed to address some of these issues. The context, content and implications 
of this reform as well as how its content was shaped by will be the content of the following chapter.  
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5 The 2010 Quota and Governance Reform  
In the following chapter an examination of the reform and its presumed results will be presented 
along with an analysis of the different actors regarding the implementation of the 2010 reform and 
the power they hold. 
 
5.1 The context of the reform 
 
Before the global financial crisis paralyzed most of the world economies, the popular opinion of the 
IMF was that it had largely lost its relevance (Truman, 2009). The principal reason was the 
legitimacy crisis from which the IMF was suffering. Due to it’s handling of the various crises, 
including the Latin American and Asian Financial Crisis, the IMF was subject to severe criticism 
that had impacted the legitimacy and respect for the organization (Stiglitz, 2002, Chang, 2002). 
After the Asian Financial Crisis, several countries were still experiencing national balance of 
payment issues, but generally refrained from turning to the IMF for assistance (Rapkin & Strand, 
2006). As mentioned, the IMF, despite its foundational role as the global economic ‘big brother’ 
and lender of last resort, has always been depending on the interest rates of its loans to finance its 
actions, staff wages etc. (Truman, 2009). Therefore the fund experienced a decline in its 
‘customers’ (i.e.countries with balance of payments problems) even though there was still a 
‘customer base’ (Helleiner and Momani, 2007). The persistence of the IMF’s lack of legitimacy in 
its country representation, instead led countries to seek other options through bilateral financing 
schemes as well as through regional institutions (Rapkin & Strand, 2006) . As this decline in IMF-
activity happened, critics started to speculate whether the IMF, one of the great global governing 
institutions in economic affairs, had lost its purpose (Helleiner and Momani, 2007). Furthermore, 
the IMF needed to reflect the fact that the US had gone from the world’s largest creditor to its 
largest debtor, while China is now the largest in creditor-strength (Woods, 2010, Lesage et al 2013). 
During this “crisis of mission” (Helleiner, 2007), the Fund experienced a severe decline in its credit 
lines pre-2008-crisis, with a total of near 100 billion USD in 2005 to only around 10 billion by 
September 2008 (Truman, 2009).  
 
When Dominique Strauss-Kahn became elected as the new Managing Director in 2007, one of his 
first actions was to call for a reform that would make the IMF regain some of its lost importance 
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and prestige by adjusting to demands for more multilateral global governance. Indeed, when he 
wasn’t chasing the wife of the Argentine Central Bank’s Director, Strauss-Kahn put much of his 
personal gravitas in reclaiming IMF’s legitimacy. He found the power sharing agreement between 
he found to be "less and less defensible" (BBC, 2007). The request for reforms were, interestingly 
enough, echoed by the US among others (Woods, 2010). The reason probably being that for the 
IMF to do its comeback, it was necessary to do both governance and financial reforms (ibid). In 
large part, the IMF itself had managed to initiate a process of governance reforms: first in Singapore 
in 2006, where (relatively small) ad-hoc quota increases were given to a number of emerging 
markets and again in 2008 with reforms aimed to create a foundation for an IMF that could better 
adjust to a changing world in which emerging markets and developing countries would play a larger 
role (Strauss-Kahn in IMF 2008). These reforms were meant to address the IMF’s legitimacy issue 
and seeked to establish a foundation for more future reforms (IMF press release 2011).  
 
5.2 The Global Financial Crisis  
 
Things changed when the Lehman Brothers Crashed in September 2008. As the global economy fell 
into deep recession, the role of the IMF as an important governing actor in the global economy 
would again become clear (Lesage et al 2015). When the crisis struck, several countries who would 
normally be considered ‘contributors’ rather than ‘borrowers’ (such as Hungary, Iceland, Spain and 
Portugal) would all require financial assistance from the fund (Lesage et al., 2013). With customers 
standing in line, the financial pool of resources of the IMF quickly depleted (ibid).  
This “re-emergence” of the need for the IMF became clear in an ad-hoc meeting in September 2008 
where finance ministers decided to triple the amount of borrowing that the IMF was able to lend out 
prior to the Crisis (Lesage et al, 2015). The major economies proved that they were willing to 
provide the funding necessary for the IMF to carry out its tasks in this new crisis-stricken world. 
While one can wonder why the countries were willing to contribute to the funding of the IMF 
during the crisis while not before, one scholar points to the fact, that by operationalizing the funding 
through a multilateral institution, such as the IMF the risk of default payments minimized compared 
to bilateral agreements, since the fund pools the resources from every contributor (Woods, 2010). In 
a time where bilateral agreements seemed to be the preferred option,, the recession-struck countries 
found however, that multilateral financing was necessary to avoid severe market failure. The risk of 
offering regional or bilateral lending was simply too high, compared to the less speculative 
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institutional ‘security net’ that IMF provided (Lesage et al, 2013). The IMF had indeed regained its 
former role in the global economy, but had yet to find an appropriate solution to its own crisis of 
legitimacy. 
 
5.3 The Reform 
 
In the follow-up of the global financial crisis, the G20 countries had a significant role in the fund’s 
aim of restoring the legitimacy of the IMF. The G20s influence on the agenda of the IMF’s internal 
affairs is quite salient, and one could therefore argue that the G20 as an actor holds great productive 
power as the most direct response to increased multi-polarity (Wade 2011). This becomes 
particularly clear when looking at both its foundational purpose and its actions during the global 
financial crisis of 2008. As previously described, the G20 forum was established in order to advise 
and keep track of the IMF’s actions after the severe criticism of the fund’s activities in the Asian 
Financial Crisis in the 1990’s. The G20 essential purpose in relation to the IMF has mainly been to 
make sure that the IMF’s actions are in accordance with the leading economies of the G20 
(Bénassy-Quéré & Béreau, 2011). The G20’s different types of power influencing the IMF becomes 
especially clear when looking at its agenda-setting role in the 2010 reform process.     
As several countries long had expressed their dissatisfaction with the fund’s internal country 
representation, the revival of IMF during the 2008 financial crisis created a sort of general 
consensus towards changing the issue-points. This informal “consensus” among the countries 
became formal later in 2008 at the G20 Summit in Washington. At this meeting it was decided that 
the G20 countries had to take the first steps towards a reformation of the IMF’s internal structure in 
order to make further advancements in the crisis-enhanced global economic cooperation (Linn and 
Bradford, 2008).  
Concrete steps to strengthen the IMF was set in motion  at the 2009 G20 meeting in London. At this 
meeting, the G20 agreed to assign 250 billion US Dollars of special drawing rights of further 
funding to the New Agreement to Borrow (NAB); the IMFs additional resources (Lesage et al, 
2015). The NAB, as an additional credit line for the IMF, does not impact quota subscription (and 
thus voting) outside the use of the funds taken from the NAB itself. It is merely a way for the IMF 
to increase the adequacy of its resources. Important emerging market economies such as China 
joined forces in providing financial assistance for the IMF through the NAB. The BRIC countries 
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combined had paid above 16% of the NAB, and thus proved that they were both able and willing to 
contribute to the IMF though while expressing their view on the necessity of an IMF governance 
reform (ibid). The increase of the IMF resources, through the NAB and other short-term 
arrangements, provided a trebling of the previous amount to a total of 750 billion USD. However, 
this astounding amount of money, shrunk in comparison to the sole required assistance of Greece 
amounting 315 billion USD (Ibid). The funding was not enough for the IMF to assist the global 
balance of payments problems; barely enough to support more than one country.  
In order to take measures aimed at avoiding a similar situation in the future, some of BRICs that 
had contributed heavily to the fund via the NAB, increased the criticism of the fund’s legitimacy 
issue and put pressure on the fund to reform itself in a more inclusive and representative direction 
(Woods, 2010). At this stage it was no longer possible to postpone the reforms that had long been at 
the heart of those calling for an increased voice in the IMF. Amidst this increasing dissatisfaction 
from EMDCs, the G20 countries would finally take up the issue of reform, and suggestions from 
the IMFC based on the G20 countries’ inputs concerning the governance and quota distribution was 
created. First it was to be approved by the Executive Board and the Board of Governors. 
 
5.4 The shape of the 2010 reform 
 
The suggestion for reform was taken into discussion at the Executive Board’s 14th General Review 
of Quotas with the purpose of reaching a consensus of a final reform proposition. The IMFC’s 
suggestions for an operational reform, which was based on the views expressed at the G20 London 
summit (Woods, 2010). Although several points in the suggestion was echoing that of the EMDCs: 
In order to increase legitimacy and better reflect the global economic reality, a division of quota 
shares of at least 5% should be shifted “from over-represented countries to under-represented 
countries using the current quota formula as a basis (...) While protecting the voting share of the 
poorest members”(IMF Quota and Governance Reform 2010). 
Through dragging discussions in the Executive Board, the Obama administration sped up the 
process of formulating the reform by expressing that the US would veto any result if a final 
consensus was not presented soon (Bénassy-Quéré & Béreau, 2011). The final shape of the reform 
stated that a specific change in quota shares of 6% should be shifted from overrepresented countries 
to underrepresented, while still protecting the lowest income countries’ representation by not using 
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the quota formula nor GDP blend to calculate their share. Instead their shares should be agreed 
upon through the so-called ‘ad-hoc’ increases, which are decided through discussions of a specific 
country’s economy in the EB. In accordance to this shift in quotas the New Arrangement to Borrow 
shares was to be transferred into real quota shares as well, while a doubling of total quotas 
including increases in basic votes should have been implemented (Rapkin & Strand, 2006). 
Alongside the quota redistributions, an alignment of the structural foundations of the Executive 
Board was presented as well. This included an elimination of the appointed seats in the EB, 
changing it into an all-elected Board, offering  an opportunity for appointing an Alternate Executive 
Director for constituencies with 7 members or more, sharing one seat in the Board. The suggestion 
to maintain the Executive Board at the size of 24 chairs was also presented, while an adjustment of 
European chair holders would be downgraded by two seats allowing EMDC’s to accede the Board 
even further (ibid). 
The reform proposal was to be seen as a complete package, which meant that neither the quota 
redistribution nor the governance alignment could be implemented without the backing of the other. 
The 2010 reform package with its major proposals on governance realignments and quota 
redistribution was considered under the Articles of Agreements (ibid). The implementation of the 
reform would result in an adjustment of the Articles that was constituted requiring an 85% majority 
vote. Due to this requirement it has proven difficult to attain an 85% majority and the 
implementation deadline has been postponed until December 27th 2015 (Lesage et al., 2013). The 
different aspects of the reform, had it been implemented and the intentions of the actors preventing 
this will be examined in the following.  
 
5.5 The implications of the reform  
 
In the case of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform gaining majority in the Executive Board 
critics still claim that the reform would not be as game-changing as most of the fund’s member 
countries demand it should. Several IMF critical scholars has examined the outcomes of the 2010 
reform and their findings speaks for themselves. 
As described previously, a shift in 6% of quota shares from countries that are considered 
overrepresented to countries that are considered underrepresented should have been implemented. If 
2010 Quota and Governance Reform 
International Studies  
 
28 
28 
done so, only 2.6% of would be transferred from developed countries to EMDCs. Of these 2,6%, 
0,6% goes to South Korea and Singapore. In the view of the IMF these countries are categorized as 
emerging markets although several economics questions this label (Lesage et al 2015). The IMF 
(and the World Bank) played around with typologies of which countries were developed and 
developing in order to make quota and voting shifts appear larger than they actually were (Wade 
and Vestergård, 2014; 2015). The reform would also increase the assigned quota for 50 countries, 
with the main beneficiaries being China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Colombia, 
Singapore, The Emirates and Vietnam. The United States will not lose its veto as a result of the 
reform, since the quota shift will mainly occur among the overrepresented European countries (New 
Rules 2012).  
Several European countries that have lost their seat in the executive board from the reforms have 
formed new constituencies in the IMF. For instance, Austria has formed a constituency in which 
Turkey and Hungary (among others) are included. The BeNeLux countries will also form a new and 
larger constituency with other countries who also stand to lose. Switzerland has also entered into a 
constituency, rotating its chair with Poland, and the Nordic seat now includes the Baltic countries 
(New Rules 2012). By simply remaking constituencies, the European countries still manage to 
remain overrepresented at the Executive Board by controlling one third (or 7) of the seats. The 
impact of the reform on European seats of the EB is therefore minimal. In contrast, the African 
countries still only have 2 seats at the executive board (Lesage et al 2015).  
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the at the time of the reform Executive Director, hailed the 2010 reform 
as “the most fundamental governance overhaul in the Fund’s 65-year history” and “the biggest 
ever shift of influence in favor of emerging market and developing countries” (IMF 2010, 1). 
However the impacts of the reform, while maybe can be labeled as being a step towards a historic 
change, just is not quite adequate to redeem IMF’s long lost legitimacy. 
As proven in the recent global financial crisis the trebling of funding resources promised by the 
G20 has not been adequate for solving this major financial crisis. The strain put on the IMF by its 
lending to Greece, amounting to more than 300 billion USD provides evidence of this (Lesage et al, 
2015). It is therefore unlikely that the IMF will be able to act as the ‘global crisis lender’ if a larger 
country, whether an advanced economy or an Emerging Market, ran into a similar kind of trouble. 
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Second, it can be argued that the reform agreement was only sub-standard for large EMDCs such as 
the BRIC (S), but they simply chose to take the best deal they could get under current 
circumstances (Lesage et al, 2015). As mentioned above, only 2,6% of the quota “shift” is in favor 
of EMDCs. Most importantly, the BRICs did not get a veto power with only a calculated voting 
power of only 13,5% and a slightly higher quota share (Vestergaard and Wade, 2014). 
In light of this criticism, we can ask ourselves whether the reform actually managed to solve IMF’s 
two-fold problem of legitimacy and capital stock adequacy. One can argue that the 2010 Quota and 
Governance Reform was a little step in the direction of changing its internal structures. It is difficult 
not to argue that the process of forming the reform were, at least to some extent, also an attempt to 
satisfy the critics calling for better representation within the fund (Woods, 2010). A more 
representative distribution of power that constitutes, to a larger or smaller degree, a slightly 
different model of the global economy than the one that preceded it. But it follows that, since a 
change in the distribution of power was a principal implication of the reform, the existing 
distribution of power may have been a large shaping factor in the process of reform (Lesage et al, 
2013). This is what we will now turn our attention to.     
 
5.6 How the different actors and the power they hold have shaped the reform 
negotiations 
 
During the whole process of legitimizing the IMF, the BRICs, with Brazil as the dominant voice, 
played a significant role. The BRIC countries fundamental strength in the reform negotiations was 
their ability to use their vast foreign exchange reserves to contribute to the IMF (Lesage et al, 
2013). These important EMDCs had to react to the crisis that was causing their exports and its 
concomitant growth to decline and the measures taken, in the shape of their significant payments of 
the NAB, translated into substantial productive power. The offering of financial resources to the 
fund came with a demand for reform; the fund needed to actively take action by reforming in order 
to enable itself to better reflect the power distribution of the global economies (ibid). This demand 
established the foundation for the 2010 reform negotiations. The IMF was lacking in financial 
resources so the fund was not in a position to decline. However, the demand for a reform to increase 
the IMF’s legitimacy had for long been an ongoing debate. Therefore the demand from Brazil came 
not as direct enforcer of unwanted change, rather the opposite. The BRIC countries had great 
interest in increasing the legitimacy since their share of world GDP reached 21% in 2013, their 
2010 Quota and Governance Reform 
International Studies  
 
30 
30 
combined quota share is below 15% and their influence in the IMF is therefore rather limited 
(Reuters, 2013). Therefore the BRICs took the opportunity of creating an agenda setting condition 
for contributing to the IMF capital stock increase. 
While the BRIC countries with particular focus on Brazil can be said to some extent have enforced 
the reform through productive power, this power soon diminished in comparison to powers 
operating within the IMF allowed by the fund’s internal structures. 
The United States of America had several advantages that put it in a favorable position in the 
process of negotiating the terms and outcomes of the reform. First and foremost, the US wields 
significant institutional power in the IMF.  The power of the US to veto any proposal in the IMF is 
unique to any one state. As the only single entity in the IMF that wields enough votes to hold a 
veto, the US is able to “freeze” asymmetries within the organization by blocking decisions or 
reforms that goes against its interests (Lesage et al, 2013).  For this reason, should the 2010 reform 
have had chance of being implemented the way the hierarchy in the fund is structured now, it would 
have to have been approved by the United States which as previously stated, did not ratify it.  
But US institutional power within the IMF’s governance structure, although it is important, cannot 
explain all the power that the US wields to determine the outcomes in the IMF. It is also the state 
that wields the most structural power – the kind of power working through more abstract social 
relations through indirect means. The International Political Economist, Susan Strange, is the 
champion of this concept. Strange argued, that by having established the rules and mechanisms that 
the global economy works within, the US is at a unique and powerful position within in it (Sell 
2014). Most importantly to the US structural power is the fact that its national currency is also the 
world’s reserve currency. This, some economists argue, gives it the ability to run higher deficits and 
to print more money that anyone else (Lesage et al, 2015).  
Not only did the US go into the 2010 reform negotiations with large structural and institutional 
power, it also had a rather good case. The US was, according to the 2008 quota formula as well as 
according to the GDP blend, underrepresented (2010 Quota and Governance Reform). The US 
leadership was aware that this would give it a very strong case in the negotiations around the 
reform, and that it would therefore primarily be the overrepresented European countries that would 
have to adjust their quota share and seats on the EB. Further strengthening the US case is the 
country’s special relationship to the staff of whom many are trained in America (Woods, 2003). 
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The US was therefore in a quite good bargaining position and could predict that promising the 
BRIC-countries a greater say in the IMF’s structure could actually end up benefitting the US on the 
cost of European influence in the IMF (Lesage et al, 2013). 
The largest losers of the reform proposal would be the overrepresented smaller European Countries. 
This did not come as a surprise, and these countries were sound about their willingness to make 
compromises (Lesage et al, 2015). The question was therefore how much these states would have to 
let go in terms of EB seats and quota share. The modest results of the 2010 Quota and Governance 
Reform testify to their ability to negotiate from this rather defensive position. In theory, the large 
northern European Union countries could bail out their southern neighbors, and this was a sign of 
large structural power of the European Union (ibid). Nevertheless, it was a condition for Germany 
that the IMF partook in these schemes (that by 2010 would become The European Financial 
Stability Facility). Therefore, the EU preferred a strengthened IMF. The EU also held significant 
institutional power via its veto power (that is if they coordinate their votes) (Rapkin & Strand, 
2006). Furthermore, while some of the EU countries (France, Sweden and Belgium) are over-
represented in terms of quota as well as representation on the EB; others such as the UK and Spain 
are actually underrepresented and are able to use productive power via their ability to make an 
argument of “appropriateness” (Lesage et al, 2013). 
 
5.7 How the interests of states shape the way they used their power 
 
While the United States came to the reform negotiations as a strong actor, the fact was that the 
Global Financial Crisis had thrown the US into a vulnerable position with large deficits on the state 
budget. After large bail-outs, stimuli-packages and expansive monetary policy the US congress was 
not particularly keen on assigning hundreds of billions of dollars to various multilateral institutions 
(Lesage et al, 2013). After expensive programs to save their domestic economies, it was clear that 
neither the United States, despite its institutional and structural hegemony, nor the European Union 
countries, were in positions to carry the burden of paying the IMF what was needed, for it to carry 
out its stabilizing role. It was simply doubtful  
Whether they wanted to pay. In this context it was quite ideal to turn to those Emerging Markets 
that had large foreign currency reserves and could afford to pay their part (ibid).  
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Nevertheless, the negotiations at the G20, IMFC and EB-levels, the US in particular, had to hit a 
fine balance between keeping its veto and externalize costs by making sure reserve-rich EMDCs 
paid up. Nevertheless, given the western states’, and particularly the US powerful negotiating 
position, it cannot surprise much that the 2010 quota and Governance Reform did not give the 
BRIC enough votes to combine their voting power into a veto (ibid). 
 
Why would the BRICs contribute to multilateral funding in the IMF without guarantees of reform? 
One argument comes from the fact that the BRICs have piled up foreign currency reserves that 
made up a staggering 4,4 trillion US Dollars. This amount holds two consequences to it. First, it 
puts into perspective the BRIC countries incentive to contribute to the financing of the IMF with the 
purpose of recovering the world economies, since otherwise the countries would risk the possibility 
of the US dollar devaluating (Lesage et al, 2013). More than anything the status of the dollar as the 
world’s principal reserve currency is a source of this power. This “dollar hegemony” allows the US 
to; in theory at least, create as much credit as it wishes to as well as run longer term balance of 
payments deficits. Through the status of the Dollar, the US can almost single-handedly infuse 
liquidity into the global economy (Lesage et al, 2013, Wade, 2011). The role of the dollar might 
therefore have been one reason why the BRICs preferred to multi-lateralize risk via the IMF since 
infusions of SDR would not create inflation in the dollar to the same extent that large dollar-
infusions of liquidity would (Lesage et al, 2013). This, for the BRIC’s, creates some dependency on 
the IMF as an institution, which subjected these countries to US institutional power.  While the 
BRICs had a good case for the imperative of IMF-reform, it simply was not adequate to secure a 
spectacular deal. It can however be speculated that the BRICs were hoping to gain further quota 
increases in the future, and therefore viewed a strengthening of their status at the IMF as a gradual 
process (Lesage et al, 2013). 
 
5.8 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we presented the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform. The Global Financial Crisis 
was indeed a serious crisis in which all states were mutually vulnerable. For the IMF on other hand, 
it was a point of revival. It would make more sense than ever for states to strengthen collective 
action to stop global issues of sudden capital flight and financial panic. The IMF, as the premier 
international institution for monetary cooperation, has the assigned task of providing countries 
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experiencing balance of payments issues, with loans in order to maintain financial openness. The 
G20 chose to respond to the crisis with a strategy that would massively infuse liquidity in the 
international economy - a policy that would require a strengthened IMF in order to multi-lateralize 
the risk.  
In order to strengthen the IMF, however, two issues had to be addressed: (1) The IMF’s legitimacy 
among emerging markets had to be restored by increasing their voice in the organization, and (2) 
the Fund had to raise capital in order to do its work. The western states, some of which are 
perceived by EMDCs to be overrepresented, had the power within the IMF’s governance structure, 
while the emerging markets had capital to post into the IMF (Lesage et al, 2013). 
These facts raise the question whether the 2010 IMF reform should be understood as a trade-off 
between the west’s power in the IMF and the emerging markets financial support. In the chapter we 
analyzed the role of the various involved actors’ interests and powers in the process of negotiating 
the IMF reforms, and we argued that the shape of the Reform was actually in large part a product of 
the various kinds of powers that these states held, both within the IMF and in the global economy.  
The reform process, however, has hit a gridlock and the 2010 Quota and Governance reform is yet 
to be implemented. In the next chapter we will discuss why and what the consequences may be. 
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6 The fragmentation of Global Economic Governance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The deadline for ratification of the 2010 reform has been postponed to the end of 2015. The original 
deadline for implementation in 2012 indicates that it is very difficult for the IMF to reform. It is 
paradoxical that the 2010 Quota and Governance reform required intensive work from so many, 
represents a proposal reached through a consensus in the Executive Board but still has yet to take 
effect. This chapter examines why the US does not ratify the reform and considers the measures that 
the IMF as an independent organisation can take if the US continues to refuse ratification. 
Subsequently, the chapter will discuss some of the consequences of  the IMF’s inability to better 
represent important EMDCs  
 
6.2 Why the reform not been implemented 
 
With the intensive work that was put into the 2010 reform it is ironical that the 2010 Quota and 
Governance Reform has yet to pass the veto power of the US Congress. The country’s refusal to 
ratify is surprising since, as argued previously, the reform’s final proposal came out to be a rather 
good deal for the US. One should note that the real power re-allocation within the IMF, suggested 
by this reform, although quite limited, would largely happen at the expense of the European 
Countries and not the United States (Vestergaard, 2015). Despite the European countries having the 
ability to veto (when combining their voting power), the European nations nonetheless supported 
the 2010 Quota and Governance reform, while the United States Congress, contrary to the interests 
of the Obama administration, refused to ratify the reform due to what appear to be domestic 
political power struggles between the Democrats and Republicans (ibid).  
According to the US congressmen who actively work against the US ratification of the IMF reform, 
an increased engagement in IMF matters will be a waste of US taxpayers’ money (Lesage et al, 
2015), Contributing financially to the IMF reform package is simply “too politically sensitive in the 
tense budget environment” (Callaghan, 2013, Yukhananov, 2013, Lesage et al, 2015). However, 
this statement’s validity is questionable. Particularly since the proposed quota increase will draw 
upon the rollback of the NAB. This means that the IMF will require no additional US citizen ‘tax-
money’, aside from what has already been payed through the NAB (Truman, 2015, US Treasury, 
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2014).  Nevertheless, it is true that the US may experience more difficulty accessing it’s IMF-
funding from quota subscriptions than to withdraw its subscriptions to the NAB that only has to be 
renewed at a five-year basis.  The reason to block the veto must therefore be ideological. As one 
researcher puts it: 
“Republicans are hostile to the Fund, seeing it as a vaguely socialist institution which protects 
governments from market discipline by “bailing them out” in the event of a crisis.” (Vestergaard, 
2015 p. 2). 
 
Meanwhile there are voices in the US fearing that the US failure to ratify the reform will cause the 
US a loss of influence in the IMF. In a letter to Congressman John Boehmer, the current speaker of 
the House of Representatives (and a republican hardliner), a couple of hundred high-ranking US 
servants in the IMF voice their concerns;  
“Congressional enactment of the proposed IMF legislation will sustain U.S. leadership in global 
financial matters. Failure to act would diminish the role of the United States in international 
economic policy-making and undermine U.S. efforts to promote growth and financial stability.” 
(Coplin et al, 2013, p.1). 
 
The refusal from the US to ratify the reform, unsurprisingly, has not been well received by the 
emerging market economies. Particularly outspoken of this issue is Brazil, a country that has 
extensively emphasized the need for reform of the IMF. The Finance Minister of Brazil, expressed 
in an interview regarding the reform, that “resistance to reform undermines efforts to transform the 
IMF into a truly multilateral and respected organization” (Callaghan, 2013). 
This dissatisfaction is echoed from within the IMF itself.  Six months ago IMF Managing Director, 
Christine Lagarde, stated that the reform was “due in 2012, it was overdue in 2014 and I strongly 
hope that under President Obama's leadership and with the right understanding of the parties, the 
role of the IMF warrants that ratification” (Financial Times, 2014).  
 
Whether this pressure will affect the US Congress decisions is obviously unclear. However, a 
possibility for the IMF could be to seek other options to enhance the fund’s legitimacy without 
consent from its member-states. (Vestergaard, 2015).  
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Economist Edwin Truman suggests a number of options for the IMF to enhance its legal-rational 
authority and circumvent the current reform-gridlock: 
 
One option involves accepting the current status quo of US veto power. This would imply to either 
wait for the Congress to maybe approve the proposal, or wait until after the next US election in 
2016, in the hopes of gathering a Congress with a more positive attitude towards the IMF and the 
reform proposal (Truman, 2015, p2).  
Another option is more proactive. The IMF could segment the reform at the EB’s 15th general 
review, so that the reform proposal would not need Congressional approval. A new and revised 
reform proposal could be negotiated without requiring further amendments to the Articles of 
Agreements that would only require a 70% majority vote in the IMF. The Articles of Agreements 
do provide some space for this kind of step (ibid). 
A third suggested option for the IMF is to consider more drastic measures such as the creation of a 
‘Supra-Fund’. This fund should function under the IMF but with an increased organizational 
autonomy, in order to avoid representation of countries similar to the IMF. This ‘Supra-Fund’ could 
then operate without the limitation of the United States domestic political discrepancies and the 
fund should eventually “effectively supersede the current IMF” (Ibid). 
 
These perspectives on the possible options for the legal-rational aspect of the IMF to take action 
towards reforming are something the world has yet to experience. 
So far it has been the coactivational (i.e. the fund’s dependence on its member states) aspect of the 
IMF that has been the decisive actor in the process of reform. The kind of strategy that the IMF will 
operationalize, while unknown, can still be a decisive factor of which status the IMF retains in the 
global world.  
 
And while time passes, an increasing amount of new alternatives to the IMF has arisen. Brazilian 
Finance Minister Guido Mantega in 2007 expressed that; “We will seek self-insurance by building 
up high levels of international reserves (… )The fragmentation of the multilateral financial system, 
which is already emerging, will accelerate.”  (Mantega in Vestergaard, 2015, p. 4).  
If the Western states  keep using their power within the IMF to deny important EMDCs the same 
influence it may follow that Global Economic Governance will  fragment. This may be exactly 
what has happened throughout the last year couple of years , and the increasing cooperation 
between the BRICS could be perceived as testimony of this (Wade, 2011).  
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In July 2014, the BRICS founded the “BRICS New Development Bank”, a bank aiming at 
increasing the funds to the equivalent of 100 billion US Dollars (BRICS contingency reserve 
arrangements treaty, 2014). Funds will be taken from the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a 
shared foreign exchange reserve fund for the BRICS. China as well recently founded another new 
initiative; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Economist, 2015, 2) . As the name 
implies, this institution is aimed at investments in infrastructure - an area of investments often 
considered lucrative. This institution has still to formulate both its articles of agreements and will 
not go into functioning until late 2015, but nevertheless already enjoy massive support, even from 
the western  countries. At more than 50 countries have joined the venture counting the UK, 
Australia, New Zealand and a lot of other western European countries (Economist, 2015, 2). The 
fact that some of the US’ key allies such as the UK have joined the AIIB have provoked the United 
States, who have discouraged its allies to join (Economist, 2015, 2). The US has also questioned 
whether the AIIB would live up to the same social standards as existing institutions such as the 
IMF, and is accused by Singaporean officials to actively lobbying against the AIIB (Economist, 
2015 2). The reaction from the IMF and the World, on the other hand, has been more positive. 
Christine Lagarde said that the IMF would be “delighted” to work with the AIIB (Business Insider, 
2015) 
 
The New Development Bank and the AIIB are widely believed to be products of the stalled reform-
process of the IMF (Economist, 2015, Economist, 2015, 2, The Politic, 2015, Engdahl, 2015). The 
slow and difficult process of reforming the IMF might have provided the AIIB with some of the 
legitimacy that the IMF is (so far without results) struggling for. As former US treasury secretary 
Lawrence Summers said when asked about the role of the emerging markets in the IMF reform 
process; “They can quite legitimately ask, ‘excuse me, you guys have had 5 ½ years to support a 
reasonable role for us in the IMF, and you have not done it,’” (Bloomberg, 2015). 
In March Zhao Changhui, an economist in the import-export bank of China, told the Guardian that 
“The founding of AIIB is a challenge to the US’s economical and political dominance. It’s also a 
challenge to the establishments controlled by the US, such as the World Bank.”(Guardian, 2015).  
 
The dominance of the US in the IMF, and the US Congress’ lack of vision of the institution is 
largely to blame for the IMF’s inability to legitimize itself  (Vestergaard and Wade, 2014). One can 
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therefore argue that the issues of reforming the IMF under its current division of power has enabled 
certain actors to ‘freeze’ the power structure, without any elementary changes to this structure in 
sight.  
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7 Conclusion 
 
Throughout this project, we have argued that the IMF’s governance structure has a certain 
distribution of power attached to it. The quota system that makes up the pecking order of the fund 
was always meant to reflect a country’s gravity in the world economy and thus also inside the IMF. 
However, for quite some time the IMF has been suffering from a legitimacy crisis, in large part due 
to its inability to reflect changes in the relative economic gravity of various countries. When the 
Global Financial Crisis erupted, the IMF’s role in Global Economic Governance once again became 
clear. But in order to truly adapt to new global realities, the IMF still has to solve its legitimacy 
crisis in regards to better representing important emerging economies in its governance structure. 
The 2010 Quota and Governance Reform was an attempt to accommodate these needs. The whole 
process of reform, as well as its lack of implementation, is one that tells of the role of power within 
and around the IMF’s governance structure. First and foremost, power within the IMF was 
important in shaping the actual content of this reform. This power, we have argued, comes to the 
benefit of western states and particularly the United States. At the same time there are also other 
kinds of power such as structural power and productive power that has had an effect on the Reform. 
The BRICs, who were pushing for the reform, primarily had productive power. Indeed they had 
enough of it to negotiate an agreement that was nevertheless quite modest. The formation of 
agreements of the content of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform are therefore a product of the 
distribution of power both within as well as around the IMF’s governance structure.  
This reform agreement, however, has been put on hold until the US Congress ratifies it. The US’ 
institutional power, stalling the reform process, shows that the distribution of power within the 
IMF’s governance structure was not just of immense importance regarding shaping the content of 
the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform, but also the fund’s ability to implement it. This has 
consequences for Global Economic Governance, which is increasingly being fragmented as new a 
number of new institutions are being created. 
 
‘ 
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